Social Security's treatment of postwar generations by Jagadeesh Gokhale
(Complete text of testimony to be submitted to
the Senate Budget Committee, Washington,
D.C., January 19, 1999.)
T hank you for inviting me to tes-
tify before your Committee. I feel
very honored by this opportunity.
n n   Social Security’s Long-Term
Financial Shortfall
The Social Security Administration’s
(SSA’s) official projections indicate that
paying benefits under current rules dur-
ing the next 75 years will require a pay-
roll tax hike of 2.2 percentage points.1
The tax hike must be immediate, and
taxes must be maintained at that higher
level throughout the 75-year horizon. 
Although a gap of 2.2 percentage points
seems small, it is the result of looking
only 75 years ahead. It ignores the
deficits that will accrue in year 76 and
later, and makes Social Security’s
finances appear much healthier than they
actually are. Although 75 years seems to
be a long time, it is actually quite short
for a program like Social Security, which
needs to be sustained far beyond that time
horizon and is capable of influencing the
economic opportunities of several gener-
ations to come. Extending the projections
through the indefinite future reveals a
much bigger financial shortfall. SSA’s
actuaries estimate that under intermediate
economic and demographic assumptions,
fully eliminating the shortfall will require
a payroll tax rate hike of 4.7 percentage
points. This represents a 38 percent
increase over the current Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) program’s tax rate of 12.4 per-
cent.2  Even this may be an underestimate
because, relative to recent experience,
SSA’s intermediate assumptions incorpo-
rate conservative projections about gains
in longevity and optimistic assumptions
about growth in labor productivity. 
An obvious alternative to hiking payroll
taxes is reducing benefit levels. How-
ever, the reduction will have to be
equally dramatic—about 25 percent—
and will have to be kept in place indefi-
nitely. As described below, although
either alternative would resolve Social
Security’s funding shortfall, each differs
in the burden that it imposes on different
generations. Furthermore, any delay in
resolving the funding shortfall is likely
to escalate the sizes of future required
tax hikes or benefit cuts.
n n   Social Security’s Treatment 
of Postwar Americans
The tax treatment meted out by the Old
Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)
program differs significantly across
demographically distinct groups of indi-
viduals.3  My colleagues and I have ana-
lyzed the impact of OASI on postwar
demographic groups distinguished by
age, sex, race, education, and earnings.4
I briefly describe our findings based on
two indicators: The lifetime net OASI tax
rate and the OASI rate of return. 
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Social Security’s long-term funding
gap is wider than what is officially
reported or commonly perceived.
Furthermore, the program’s tax
treatment of distinct groups varies
considerably among postwar genera-
tions: Women, whites, and the college
educated have lower lifetime net tax
rates than do men, non-whites, and
those without a college education.
Among income groups, the middle
class faces the highest lifetime net tax
rate.  Social Security also provides
much lower, riskier rates of return on
past contributions than alternative
investment opportunities could yield.
ISSN 0428-1276Lifetime Net OASI Tax Rate
(LNTR)
This indicator shows the number of
cents paid as pure OASI taxes per dollar
earned over an individual’s lifetime.5  To
show the implications of current tax and
benefit rules, we calculate LNTRs, as-
suming that these rules will prevail dur-
ing the lifetimes of postwar cohorts
(those born after 1945). 
How can we gauge the significance of a
5.2 percent LNTR? Those shown in
table 1 imply substantial net-tax bur-
dens. For today’s 50-year-olds, for
example, participating in the OASI pro-
gram is equivalent to making a one-time
payment to the government of $200,000,
on average, at age 65. For today’s 18-
year-olds, however, the corresponding
figure is $270,000.
Because current rules are not sustainable,
however, net tax burdens will be even
heavier under the alternatives of increas-
ing OASI taxes by 38 percent (from 10.6
percent to 14.6 percent of taxable pay-
roll) or reducing OASI benefit levels by
25 percent. Table 2 shows how the
LNTRs of table 1 would change if either
of these policy alternatives is imple-
mented in 1999. For ease in making
comparisons, the last column in table 1 
is displayed as the first column in table 2.
The LNTRs shown in table 2 are aver-
ages across all earning levels. Under the
benefit-cut policy, middle earners’
LNTRs would increase to almost 8 per-
cent. Under the tax-hike policy, they
would exceed 10 percent for the
youngest cohorts. 
The tax-hike policy makes participating
in OASI only a little more expensive for
today’s 50-year-olds: It is now equiva-
lent to a one-time payment to the gov-
ernment of $217,000, on average, upon
reaching age 65. However, for 18-year-
olds, OASI becomes hugely more ex-
pensive—equivalent to surrendering
$414,000, on average, at age 65. Most of
the tax hike falls on younger cohorts. The
corresponding numbers for the benefit-
cut policy are $226,000 for today’s 50-
year-olds and $304,000 for today’s 18-
year-olds.
This analysis does not inform us about
the LNTRs of those born prior to
1945—today’s retirees and pre-retirees.
These generations’ payroll contributions
were made when OASI tax rates were
very low. Because they receive benefits
under current rules, it would be reason-
able to conjecture that their LNTRs are
much lower than those of postwar gener-
ations. Of course, an increase in payroll
taxes would have little effect on current
retirees’ LNTRs. A 25 percent benefit
cut, however, is likely to increase their
LNTRs substantially.
OASI Tax Treatment by 
Sex, Race, and Education
Our calculations show that men face
higher LNTRs than women, whereas
whites and the college educated face
lower LNTRs relative to non-whites and
the non-college educated, respectively.
The better net-tax treatment of women
compared to men is partly the result of
the progressive benefit formula—wo-
men tend to have lower earnings than
Lifetime earnings
Lowest Middle Highest
Birth year 20 percent 20 percent 20 percent All
1945–54 –5.7 5.7 5.0 5.2
1955–64 –4.4 5.8 5.0 5.2
1965–74 –3.5 5.9 5.2 5.5
1975–84 –4.0 5.7 5.2 5.4
1985–94 –3.5 5.5 5.1 5.2
1995–00 –2.8 5.6 5.3 5.3
SOURCE: Based on Caldwell et al. (1998); see footnote 3.
Table 1 suggests the following conclusions: 
Under current rules,
• Overall, OASI imposes a pure tax of just over 5 percent of lifetime earnings.
• Earlier-born generations are not treated differently from later-born ones.
• Low earners face negative LNTRs due to the progressive benefit formula. 
• Middle earners pay the highest LNTRs—close to 6 percent of lifetime earnings. 
• Highest earners face lower-than-average LNTRs due to a cap on taxable earnings.
Current 38 percent 25 percent
rules tax increase benefit cut
Percent Percent
Birth year LNTR LNTR change  LNTR change
1945–54 5.2 5.6 8.5 5.8 13.1
1955–64 5.2 6.1 18.0 5.8 12.1
1965–74 5.5 7.3 33.5 6.1 11.8
1975–84 5.4 8.3 53.1 6.1 12.3
1985–94 5.2 8.2 57.5 5.9 13.1
1995–00 5.3 8.4 57.3 6.0 13.0
SOURCE: Based on Caldwell et al. (1998); see footnote 3.
Table 2 suggests the following conclusions: 
Under a 38 percent tax-rate hike (from 10.6 percent to 14.6 percent) beginning in 1999,
• Older cohorts are less affected—most of their tax-paying years are behind them.
• Younger cohorts’ LNTRs exceed 8 percent, an increase of over 50 percent.
Under a 25 percent cut in benefit levels beginning in 1999,
• LNTRs of all postwar cohorts rise to about 6 percent—by just over 10 percent. 
• The tax treatment of all postwar generations under OASI remains similar.
TABLE 1: Lifetime Net OASI Tax Rates (percent): 
Current Tax and Benefit Rules
TABLE 2: Lifetime Net OASI Tax Rates (percent):
Alternative OASI Policiesmen on average. It is also due to spousal
and survivor benefits that women, being
longer lived, predominantly receive.
Moreover, these benefits are based on
their spouses’ higher earnings. This
reflects the intent of the OASI program
of insuring retirees against dependency
and widowhood. However, such insur-
ance provision entails a cost: The redis-
tribution of income that it requires
breaks the link between work and its
rewards and may distort people’s deci-
sions regarding labor-force participation.
The better treatment of whites and the
college educated occurs due to OASI’s
regressive tax schedule as well as due to
their greater longevity compared to non-
whites and the non-college educated.
This may also be viewed as insurance
provision against outliving resources for
groups with greater longevity. However,
this insurance provision, again, has neg-
ative implications for national saving: 
It makes individuals less sensitive to the
possibility of outliving their resources
and induces them to consume more. 
OASI Rate of Return (RR)
Participating in the OASI program in-
volves making payroll contributions
while working in exchange for the prom-
ise of retirement benefits when old and 
of survivor support for dependents after
death. From a worker’s perspective, the
stream of benefits after retirement and
death may be viewed as a return on the
“investment” of payroll contributions.
The indicator, RR, shows the yield (in
percent) accruing by way of benefits on
the initial OASI contributions for differ-
ent postwar cohorts.6  Table 3 lists RRs
under a) current tax and benefit rules; 
b) a 38 percent OASI tax increase; and,
alternatively, c) a 25 percent benefit cut.
In addition to being very low, OASI’s
rates of return are risky: When and to
what extent taxes will be increased, or
benefits reduced, are unknown to current
participants. OASI’s returns are lower
than those obtainable on 10-year 
Treasury inflation-protection securities
(TIPS). Today, these securities yield real
returns greater than 3.5 percent and, in
addition, are considered to be almost
perfectly safe. Hence, participation in
OASI, whether under current rules or
under the two policy alternatives dis-
cussed here, imposes a significant cost
on postwar generations in terms of the
forgone opportunity to invest OASI con-
tributions in higher-yielding assets. 
n n    How Well Does OASI Pool
Earnings Risk?
OASI’s progressive benefit formula
redistributes income from high- to low-
earning individuals. This redistribution
can be viewed as a method of pooling the
risk of realizing low lifetime earnings
across the population. However, OASI’s
regressive tax schedule limits the amount
of such risk pooling. Indeed, because the
well-to-do enjoy greater longevity, OASI
may, in some cases, redistribute from
poorer to richer households, thus exacer-
bating earnings risk. An indicator of the
degree to which OASI helps us in pool-
ing earnings risk is the amount by which
it reduces the variability of income
across individuals. Our calculations sug-
gest that OASI lowers lifetime income
variability by only 6 percent—a small
but not negligible amount.
n n    Using the Budget Surplus for
“Saving” Social Security
Although many policymakers and econ-
omists state that projected budget sur-
pluses could be used for “saving” Social
Security, most neglect to mention that
much, if not all, of the surpluses emerge
because of the Social Security program
itself. That being the case, the sugges-
tion that budget surpluses represent
monies in addition to those already ear-
marked for paying future Social Secu-
rity benefits is incorrect. The aforemen-
tioned estimate of Social Security’s
long-term funding shortfall already
incorporates the projected surpluses.
Hence, allusions to the possibility of
using these surpluses for restoring
Social Security’s long-term solvency, in
effect, count those surpluses twice.
The perception of a surplus is a product
of thinking in terms of annual cash flows.
If, however, we adopt a long-term per-
spective (over the indefinite future), no
surplus really exists because in present
value, benefit outlays far surpass the pay-
roll tax revenues that will be collected
under current rules. As a consequence,
the benefits that current adult generations
stand to receive are much larger than the
payroll taxes that they will pay. Social
Security’s net liability to current adult
generations has been variously estimated
to be between $7 trillion to $10 trillion. If
those alive today do not pay more to
TABLE 3: Rates of Return (percent): Current Rules and Alternative
OASI Policies
Current 38 percent 25 percent
rules tax increase benefit cut
Percent Percent
Birth Year RR RR change  RR change
1945–54 1.91 1.64 –14.6 1.06 –44.7
1955–64 1.77 1.27 –28.2 0.92 –47.9
1965–74 1.77 1.05 –40.7 0.94 –47.0
1975–84 1.86 0.97 –48.0 1.03 –44.5
1985–94 1.98 1.06 –46.5 1.15 –42.0
1995–00 1.87 0.92 –50.9 1.01 –46.1
SOURCE: Based on Caldwell et al. (1998); see footnote 3.
Table 3 suggests the following conclusions: 
• Under current rules, the real rate of return on contributions is less than 2 percent.
• Under current rules, younger cohorts receive similar rates of return as older ones.
• A 38 percent tax hike reduces the RRs of later-born generations by more.
• A 25 percent benefit cut reduces uniformly the RRs of all postwar generations. bridge the gap, future generations will
have to bear the financial burden. Essen-
tially, maintaining the current policy
stance redistributes resources from
future toward living generations.
As living generations perceive them-
selves to be richer because of such
redistribution, they adjust upward their
consumption and reduce their labor-
force participation. Greater consump-
tion, in turn, implies lower national sav-
ing and a lower capital base. Lower
labor-force participation, as evidenced
by the increasing trend toward earlier
retirement, implies a withdrawal of
labor resources from productive use. In
a recent study, my colleagues and I esti-
mate that the redistribution of resources
from future toward living generations
due to the net generosity of Social Secu-
rity and Medicare to those born before
1945 may account for roughly 50 per-
cent of the decline in U.S. national sav-
ing since the 1960s.7
n n    A Long-Term Perspective on
Fiscal Policy as a Whole
An analysis of the government’s entire
fiscal policy under a long-term perspec-
tive suggests an even greater fiscal
shortfall. In a recent update of U.S. gen-
erational accounts, my colleagues at the
Congressional Budget Office and I esti-
mate that U.S. fiscal policy is seriously
out of balance.8  That is, if those alive
today (the base year for the study was
1995) continue to be treated under cur-
rent fiscal policy, future generations
would, on average, have to pay signifi-
cantly higher lifetime net taxes. Such a
generationally unbalanced fiscal policy
is also unsustainable: It indicates that
taxes will have to be increased in the
future to finance scheduled government
purchases, or those purchases will have
to be retrenched.
As is the case of Social Security, a gen-
erationally balanced fiscal policy can be
achieved via tax increases, cuts in trans-
fers, or reductions in government pur-
chases. For example, if implemented
immediately and kept in place perma-
nently, a 20.4 percent income tax hike
would be required to restore genera-
tional balance in fiscal policy. That is,
average income tax rates would have to
rise from about 13.1 percent today (as
of 1995) to 15.8 percent. Alternatively,
federal purchases would have to be
reduced by 39 percent. Our calculations
show that the required changes will
become even bigger if policy changes
are postponed for a few years.
It is possible to compare the size of So-
cial Security’s long-term shortfall with
that in the entire budget. Restoring So-
cial Security’s long-term solvency re-
quires immediately and permanently
raising OASDI taxes by 4.7 percentage
points, (from 12.4 percent to 17.1 per-
cent of taxable payroll—an increase of
38 percent). However, restoring long-
term sustainability in the entire gov-
ernment budget requires those same
taxes to be increased by 6.9 percentage
points (from 12.4 percent to 19.3 per-
cent of taxable payroll—an increase 
of 56 percent).9
n n    Summary
Because SSA adopts a limited 75-year
horizon in projecting Social Security’s
finances, the officially recognized and
commonly acknowledged size of its
long-term funding shortfall appears less
than half as large as it is in truth. Under
the same economic and demographic
assumptions, deficits accruing in year
76 and beyond imply that permanently
restoring the program to solvency will
require a 38 percent increase in payroll
taxes. Alternatively, benefits would
have to be cut by about 25 percent.
Under OASI’s current rules, those born
in the postwar period may expect to pay
more than 5 percent of their lifetime
earnings as a pure tax. This rate will
increase to 6 percent or more if benefits
are cut by 25 percent. Under a 38 per-
cent tax hike, the rate would be even
higher—8 percent—for the youngest
cohorts. Under either policy, middle
earners would be hit the hardest. 
The OASI program redistributes income
from men toward women. However,
because of its regressive tax schedule
and because those with more resources
tend to live longer, lower net tax burdens
are imposed on some relatively well-to-
do groups (like whites and the college-
educated) compared to their counter-
parts. Although differences in the tax
treatment of different groups may be
viewed as a consequence of insurance
provision against dependency, widow-
hood, and poverty during old age, they
may exact a cost by altering people’s
behavior in ways that ultimately reduce
national saving and labor supply.
The real rates of return obtainable via
OASI under current rules fall far short of
those obtainable on alternative, highly
safe investments. The gap in these rates
of return will become even wider if
taxes are increased or benefits are cut to
fully resolve OASI’s long-term funding
shortfall. The program reduces the vari-
ability of income across postwar genera-
tions by about 6 percent. As such, it
seems to help only a little in pooling
earnings risk across the population.
Most, if not all, of the budget surplus
projected through 2008 emerges from
the Social Security program itself.
Hence, it is already included in estimat-
ing Social Security’s long-term funding
shortfall and counting it once again as a
resource for closing the funding gap is
inappropriate. Social Security’s total
unfunded liability has been estimated to
be between $7 and $10 trillion. This lia-
bility represents a net transfer of wealth
from future toward living generations
and may constitute a significant factor
underlying the long-term decline in U.S.
national saving.
Although Social Security’s long-term
funding shortfall appears sizable, that of
the entire budget is even larger. A fiscal
policy is sustainable only if it treats
future generations on par with its treat-
ment of living ones. Achieving such a
generationally balanced policy is likely
to require even bigger tax hikes or bene-
fit reductions than those required for
fixing Social Security’s finances alone.
Finally, waiting for several years before
implementing the necessary policy
changes is likely to force even bigger
adjustments in the future.n n    Footnotes
1. The required payroll tax hike is 1.81 per-
centage points for the OASI program and
0.38 percentage points for the Disability
Insurance (DI) program. These estimates are
based on SSA’s intermediate economic and
demographic assumptions. 
2.  These unpublished estimates were pro-
vided by SSA actuaries.
3.  The DI program is not considered in this
analysis. Also, taxes on Social Security bene-
fits are not included. Because these taxes are
relatively small, their exclusion should not
materially alter the results. More details can
be found in Steven Caldwell, Melissa
Favreault, Alla Gantman, Jagadeesh
Gokhale, Thomas Johnson, and Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, “Social Security’s Treatment of
Postwar Americans,” in James Poterba, ed.,
Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 13. Cam-
bridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic
Research (forthcoming).
4. We use two tools in implementing these
calculations: CORSIM and SSBC. CORSIM
is a computer simulation that produces life
trajectories for a representative sample of
U.S. individuals born after 1945. The life tra-
jectories generate a host of demographic
events like aging, marriage, divorce, child-
birth, employment, earnings, unemployment,
re-employment, retirement, and death. The
simulated earnings trajectories are fed into a
Social Security Benefit Calculator (SSBC).
This computer program calculates OASI
taxes and benefits based on individual earn-
ings data. SSBC calculates several types of
benefits including retirement, spousal,
mother/father, child dependent, child sur-
vivor, and divorcee benefits. The earnings,
payroll taxes, and benefits are used to calcu-
late various indicators of how Social Security
treats different groups of people.
5.  Calculating LNTR requires three items:
the present-discounted value of earnings
(PVE or “lifetime earnings”); the present-
discounted value of OASI taxes (PVT or
“lifetime taxes”); and the present discounted
value of OASI benefits (PVB or “lifetime
benefits”).
For each sample person, annual earnings,
taxes, and benefits are converted to 1997
dollars and are discounted using a 5 percent
rate to the year when he/she became age 18.
A 5 percent discount rate is used to reflect a
3.5 percent rate of return on safe investments
and a 1.5 percent premium to compensate
for the riskiness of Social Security benefits.
Next, the LNTR (in percent) is calculated as
the excess of lifetime payroll taxes over life-
time benefits as a share of lifetime earnings.
The formula is: 
LNTR = [(PVT – PVB)/PVE] x 100.
6.  Calculating RR involves finding the rate
of discount at which PVT = PVB. The
LNTR calculations show that PVT exceeds
PVB for most postwar cohorts at a 5 percent
discount rate. However, payroll taxes occur
earlier and benefits occur later in workers’
lifetimes. Hence, lowering the discount rate
increases PVB by more than it increases
PVT. The rate at which the two become
equal is RR—the rate of return that benefits
yield on the initial contributions.
7.  See Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, and John Sabelhaus, “Understand-
ing the Postwar Decline in National Saving:
A Cohort Analysis,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, vol. 1 (1996).
8.  See Jagadeesh Gokhale, Benjamin Page,
and John Sturrock, “Generational Accounts
for the United States: An Update,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Economic
Review, vol. 33, no. 4 (1997), pp. 2–23.
9.  See Jagadeesh Gokhale, “Generational
Equity and Sustainability in U.S. Fiscal Pol-
icy,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
Economic Commentary, April 15, 1998.
Jagadeesh Gokhale is an economic advisor
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
He thanks Gregory Hess and Mark Snider-
man for helpful comments.
The views stated herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Economic Commentary is available elec-
tronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on
the World Wide Web: http://www.clev.frb.org.
We also offer a free online subscription serv-
ice to notify readers of additions to our Web
site. To subscribe, please send an e-mail mes-
sage to econpubs-on@clev.frb.org.A Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
Understanding Exchange Rates
by Owen F. Humpage
January 1, 1998
Assessing Fundamental Tax Reform
by David Altig, Alan J. Auerbach, 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Kent A. Smetters, 
and Jan Walliser
January 15, 1998




Network Externalities: The Catch-22 
of Retail Payments Innovations




by Joseph G. Haubrich
March 1, 1998
What Happened to the Inventory
Overhang?
by Terry J. Fitzgerald and Jennifer K. Ransom
March 15, 1998
Private Money: Everything Old
Is New Again
by Barbara A. Good
April 1, 1998
Generational Equity and
Sustainability in U.S. Fiscal Policy
by Jagadeesh Gokhale
April 15, 1998
In Search of the NAIRU
by David Altig and Paul Gomme
May 1, 1998
Government-Subsidized Training: 
A Plan for Prosperity?
by Charles T. Carlstrom and 
Christy D. Rollow
May 15, 1998
Productivity Measures and 
the “New Economy”
by John B. Carlson and Mark E. Schweitzer
June 1998
Productivity Gains During Business
Cycles: What’s Normal?
by Mark E. Schweitzer
July 1998 
Measuring Pricing Bias in Mortgages
by Stanley D. Longhofer 
August 1, 1998
Global ATM Banking: 
Casting the Net
by John D. Hueter and Ben R. Craig
August 15, 1998 
Bank Notes and Stored-Value Cards:
Stepping Lightly into the Past
by William P. Osterberg





Currency: Time for Change?
by Paul W. Bauer
October 1, 1998
Is the Current-Account 
Deficit Sustainable?











Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted provided that
the source is credited. Please send copies 
of reprinted materials to the editor.
1998 Economic Commentary